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T
he global financial crisis and result-
ing Great Recession accelerated both 
national and international debate over the 
sustainability of U.S. government spending.  
This is the direct consequence of the crisis 
pushing the U.S. ratio of gross debt to GDP 
over 90 percent, due both to large increases 
in government spending and large decreases 
in tax revenue.  (See Figure 1.)  The fresh 
sense of urgency that this has ignited to 
solve the debt situation, however, obscures 
the fact that U.S. government spending 
was no more sustainable prior to the Great 
Recession than it is now.  Put another way, 
the recent large deficits change almost 
nothing about the long-term fiscal prospects 
of the United States.  The overwhelming 
obstacle to a sustainable fiscal path for the 
United States, regardless of the size of the 
current debt, remains health-care spending.  
The Long-Run Outlook
The basic picture of the U.S. debt situation 
is presented by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) in its Long-Term Budget Out-
look.
1  Figure 2 shows the CBO’s forecast of 
federal spending on net interest payments, 
Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security 
under two different scenarios.  The primary 
differences between the extended-baseline 
scenario (solid lines) and alternative scenario 
(dotted lines) are the assumptions made 
regarding growth in government revenue.
2  
The extended-baseline scenario adheres, in 
the words of the CBO, “closely to current 
law”:  The 2001 tax cuts expire, the reach 
of the alternative minimum tax grows, the 
tax provisions of the recent health-care 
legislation remain in place and the tax code 
remains largely in place.  Under this scenario, 
the increase in health-care spending and 
Social Security is roughly offset  
by the steady growth in tax revenue.   
In contrast, the alternative scenario takes 
the opposite assumptions of the baseline  
and assumes that tax revenue will remain 
near its historical average of 18 percent of 
GDP.  From Figure 2, three key inferences 
can be made:
1. If growth in government spending on 
health care and Social Security is matched 
by growth in government revenue, the cost 
of servicing the debt, and moreover the 
debt itself, will largely stabilize as a percent 
of GDP from 2020 to 2030.  In other words, 
the current level of the debt is not by itself 
an obstacle to fiscal sustainability.
2. If, on the other hand, the government 
increases spending on health care and 
Social Security without raising addi-
tional revenue, the debt, and the cost of 





3. As a share of GDP, outlays on Social 
Security are expected to largely stabilize 
by 2030.  Hence, the overwhelming driver 
of increases in government spending is 
health care.
Health care is often thought of as a “supe-
rior” good:  The wealthier that individuals 
are, the greater their share of income that 
they would prefer to spend on health care.
3  
Therefore, it is sensible that the United 
States would wish to spend a larger and 
larger fraction of income on health care.  
The reality, though, is that rising health-care 
spending in the absence of revenue increases 
is unambiguously unsustainable, which 
was both true and well-documented prior 
to the current debt crisis.
4  At some point, 
tough decisions have to be made regarding 
whether health care is a universal right, and, 
if it is, who is going to pay for it.  
The Current Situation 
As seen in Figure 2, net interest payments, 
and by association the debt level, should 
largely stabilize and even begin to fall as a 
fraction of GDP, provided future spending 
increases on health care are met by future 
revenue increases.  Obviously, one critical 
part of this equation is GDP growth. 
Historically, GDP growth has been the 
key ingredient for reducing the effective size 
of the U.S. debt.  Figure 3 shows that the 
U.S. gross debt-to-GDP ratio declined from 
a post-war high of over 120 percent in 1946 
to just under 38 percent by 1970.  Figure 
3 also shows that this decline was not due 
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soUrCE: office of Management and budget.
Data for 2008 through 2010 are estimates.  Debt held by 
the public is gross debt less intra-governmental debt (i.e., 
government debt held by the government; the primary such 
holder is the social security fund) and financial assets owned 
by the government. 
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the debt crisisto the government running surpluses, but 
almost entirely due to GDP growth:  The 
average budget gap was a deficit equal to 
a half percent of GDP, as the government 
ran deficits in over two-thirds of the years 
covered.  But because GDP grew on average 
3 percent per year over this period, the ratio 
of gross debt to GDP fell precipitously. 
One fair charge is that, in the current 
situation, we cannot rely on GDP growth to 
magically wipe away the debt.  In particular, 
the assertion that a causal link exists between 
high debt and low growth is particularly 
worrisome, as it would imply a reinforcing 
cycle between low growth and rising debt.
5  
But this is where it is important to remember 
that the government differs critically from 
businesses and individuals. 
As the sole manufacturer of dollars, whose 
debt is denominated in dollars, the U.S. 
government can never become insolvent, i.e., 
unable to pay its bills.
6  In this sense, the gov-
ernment is not dependent on credit markets 
to remain operational.  Moreover, there will 
always be a market for U.S. government debt 
at home because the U.S. government has 
the only means of creating risk-free dollar-
denominated assets (by virtue of never facing 
insolvency and paying interest rates over the 
inflation rate, e.g., TIPS—Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities).  Together with the 
unusually high, but manageable, level of the 
current debt, these facts imply that the cur-
rent U.S. government can wait out any short-
term economic developments until long-run 
growth is restored.
7  Further, without an 
immediate need to drastically reduce the 
debt, the mechanism between high debt and 
slow growth loses most of its credibility. 
Of course, as we have already seen with 
health care, the government does not have 
the ability to systematically increase spend-
ing without any regard for funding it.  And 
government borrowing can be extremely 
costly.  The cost of government borrowing 
is the “crowding out effect”:  Investment 
funds mobilized by the government cannot 
be used in the private sector.  It is in this 
framework, though, that classical economic 
theory argues the government should 
neither borrow nor lend, not because it has a 
moral obligation to run balanced budgets,  
but because it must consider the cost of 
diverting investment funds away from 
potentially more-productive uses.
In an economic environment like today’s, 
where real interest rates are practically zero, 
if not negative, and the unemployment rate 
remains high, the opportunity cost to society 
of the government’s mobilizing capital and 
labor is unprecedentedly low:  The private 
sector is not fully utilizing these resources; 
so, no opportunities are lost if the govern-
ment uses them.  Assuming investment proj-
ects with a positive net expected return exist, 
as they surely do, there has hardly been a less 
costly time to start such projects.
8  What no 
country can afford, however, are permanent 
increases in government spending without 
increasing tax revenue. 
Luciana Juvenal is an economist and Brett 
Fawley is a senior research associate, both at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/juvenal/  
for more on Juvenal’s work.
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The Evolution of the U.S. Debt: 1946-1970
soUrCEs: bureau of Economic Analysis and 
office of Management and budget.
FIGURE 2
soUrCE: Cbo. 
NoTE:  The solid lines denote the Cbo baseline forecast where revenues increase as a share of GDP, while the dotted lines denote the  
Cbo alternative forecast under constant tax revenues as a share of GDP.  see endnote No. 2 for additional differences between scenarios. 





























 1 See Congressional Budget Office.
 2 In addition to altering its assumptions about 
tax revenue in the alternative scenario, the CBO 
relaxes some of the assumptions that it makes 
regarding the full implementation of the recent 
health-care bill.  This slightly modifies its projec-
tions for health-care spending, though this is 
of secondary importance to the tax revenue 
assumptions.  The alternative scenario contains no 
changes in assumptions regarding Social Security; 
so, the solid and dotted lines fully overlap. 
 3 See Scheiber.
 4 See Wasylenko.
 5 See Reinhart and Rogoff.
 6 Technically, the debt ceiling could render the 
government unable to pay its bills, but the law has 
little credibility because enforcing it would almost 
certainly cause more harm than good.
 7 The long-run GDP growth assumed by the CBO is 
a fairly conservative 2.1 percent. 
 8 note that we are drawing a strict distinction 
between investment projects, e.g., infrastructure, 
which enhances the capacity of the economy and 
will likely be needed down the line, and current 
spending, which only provides services today.  
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